METHODOLOGY
The analysis methodology for investigation of combat vehicle accidents during field training exercises is intended to identify systemic problems that lead to such accidents. It is based on the "3W" approach to accident investigation and prevention developed by the U. S. Army Safety Center :
What happened? -categorized into environmental factors human error, materiel failure, and What caused it? the accident identified by the basic Army system inadequacy causing What to do about it? -specified remedial measures targeted at specific command levels
The primary data for this investigation were specifically collected to address the systemic causes for this type of accident. For a targeted calendar year, these accidents were identified for in-depth investigation and reporting using the DA Form 285-1. Individual investigations were conducted by trained safety professionals, thus providing information more directly focused on systemic accident causes than the more general data contained in the DA Form 285, the form on which all accidents are reported. For the purposes of this data collection, a DA Form 285-1 was required if the accident met one or both of the following criteria:
• 1) the most seriously injured on-duty government person, military or civilian, lost 20 or more workdays, or sustained a more serious injury; or
• 2) damage to Army property was $700 or more.
Reports were received on 83 of these accidents.
Each narrative provided in the DA Form 285-1's was examined by an analyst experienced in evaluation of narrative accident data. The analysts evaluated the circumstances of the accident in order to identify problem areas (i.e., characteristics of the accident that can be highlighted as hazardous or that require special awareness on the part of the vehicle operator/maintainer). The problem areas used were those previously identified by Sisk, Throckmorton, and Ricketson (1983) using factor analysis. The analysts making these judgments used these problem areas only after they were satisfied that problem areas in the current data were well-captured by those previously identified.
Once problem areas were identified, the analysts examined the 285-1 reports to identify the system inadequacies for each accident, that is, the deficient elements of the Army safety system that led to the accident. For example, the problem area "improper ground guiding" was found to be the result of "inadequate self-discipline" in several of the accidents. Thus, the selfdiscipline of the individual involved in the accident was the point at which 2.1 on. often the Army safety system was inadequate to prevent the accident in questi Different accidents, identified as belonging to the same problem area, resulted from different system inadequacies. The analysis summarized the system inadequacies within each problem area, and looked for patterns in the relationship between system inadequacies and problem areas.
Based upon the problem area findings discussed above, projections were made of the impacts of each of these problem areas for a one-year and a fiveyear period. Numbers of accidents, injuries, fatalities, and costs were Projected for each problem area by first determining the relative number of accidents in the sample of DA Form 285-1 data collected for the study, in the total accident data base for the single year, and in the total data base for five years. For example, there were 1915 CV accidents in FTX's over the fiveyear period, and 160 for the one-year period. The accidents reported in the 285-1's thus represented 51.9 percent of the one-year accidents and 4.3 percent of the five-year accidents.
This percentage was then used to calculate expected numbers of accidents, injuries, fatalities, and costs. For example, the problem area "improper ground guiding" included nine accidents. These nine accidents were assumed to represent 51.9 percent of the accidents associated with this problem area during the one-year period (projecting a one-year total of 17 accidents), and 4.3 percent of the five-year accidents in this problem area (projecting a five-year total of 208 accidents).
In order to project injuries, fatalities, and costs, the reciprocal of the above percentages (representing the ratio of the number of accidents in the two data pools) was multiplied by the number of injuries, number of fatalities, or the dollar costs. For example, the injury cost of the 285-1 data in the "improper ground guiding" problem area was $238,445.
T " 1S f ]9 u T e was multiplied by the reciprocal of 51.9 percent (i.e., approximately 1.928) to result in an estimated $459,653 in injury costs for the one-year period.
3.0 FINDINGS
For the selected five-year period, the total number of CV accidents during FTXs was 1,915. As a result of these accidents, 1,677 Army personnel were injured and 66 killed. The total cost of these accidents was $25,701,156, with $16,281,291 in damages to government property and $9,419,865 in personnel injury costs (see Table 1 The largest number of these serious accidents with in-depth investigations occurred in May (15.7%), October (15.7%), March (12%), August (9.6%), February (9.6%), and July (9.6%). The other six months accounted for the remaining 27.7 percent. 
3.1
In regards to collisions, 80.7 percent of the accidents occurred on-post and 19.3 percent off-post; 36.1 percent of this same group of accidents were classified as other types of collisions; 20.5 percent involved other vehicles; 18.1 percent involved running off the road; 9.6 percent involved pedestrians; 8.4 percent were collisions with objects. Six percent of the accidents were identified as backing collisions; 1.2 percent were classified as overturned.
The nine problem areas from Sisk Throckmorton and Ricketson (1983) were determined to capture all 83 of the 285-1 accidents. Table 2 provides data on the number of accidents and accident costs by problem area. Inadequate inspection/testing was the most frequent problem area (22.8 percent), and had the highest damage, total, and average cost. Excessive speed for conditions had the highest injury cost.
A total of 171 system, inadequacies was identified in the 83 serious accidents. More than one system inadequacy can be identified for an accident. The system inadequacies generating each major problem area are summarized in Table 3 . One system inadequacy, inadequate self-discipline encompasses: (1) inadequate composure, (2) inadequate attention, (3) overconfidence in self/others/equipment, (4) lack of confidence, (5) inadequate motivation/haste/pressure/attitude, and (6) efforts of alcohol/drugs/illness. 
3.2
The following sections describe the nine problem areas and the DA Form 285-1 data in each problem area. Each section begins with a summary of the accident statistics for that problem area from the DA Form 285-1 sample, and estimates for the total accident statistics for the target year and the fiveyear period. The percentages given for system inadequacies are computed without those labeled "insufficient information."
INADEQUATE INSPECTION/TESTING
Description: Inadequate inspection/testing and mechanical defect/failure make up this major problem area, to which 229 of the accidents were attributed, making it the most frequent problem area. Tank/Track Commanders and drivers failed to fully inspect their tracks, steering gear, brakes, as well as turret and hatches prior to operation; or did so improperly. 
3.4
System Inadequacies:
a. Inadequate Self-Discipline (33%)
Example: Because of inadequate attention during PMCS, SM failed to discover the worn locking mechanism on the torsion bar of the overhead hatch on a combat recovery vehicle. As the vehicle lurched forward, the hatch slammed on his thumb. The worn mechanism was not discovered during scheduled maintenance (Log Number: S4004).
b. Inadequate Maintenance (22%)
Example: The TC allowed an M60A1 tank with know defective brakes to be parked on an incline. It rolled forward and crushed the driver who was standing in front of the tank after dismounting. The TC was influenced by time pressures to operate the tank rather than deadline it. The tank had air in its hydraulic brake system that had not been purged following a power pack replacement by a contractor (Log Number: 40581).
c. Inadequate Supervision by a Direct Supervisor (15%)
Example: A SM failed to secure the loaders hatch and it fell on his head during travel on a rough trail. 
ROUGH TERRAIN
Description: FTXs are planned and executed to approach battlefield conditions which involve cross-country movement over rough terrain. CV crews and passengers are trained to be properly positioned to hold on to appropriate hand-holds, and to wear seat belts or restraints when available. This major problem area represented the second highest cost for materiel damage, $458,313.
3.5
Personnel involved in accidents associated with rough terrain failed to follow procedures for traversing cross-country (as indicated above), misjudged the speed of their CV in accommodating to rough terrain. They also failed to conduct an adequate search or behind their vehicle for any hazard. Example: In his haste, the TC failed to inspect the area to his rear prior to ordering the Ml driver to reverse direction. As a result, the tank struck a ditch, and the TC was thrown against the hatch and suffered a fractured jaw (Log Number: S4039).
b. Inadequate Experience (18%)
Example: The SM failed to hold onto a restraint in a moving APC because of his lack of experience. As the vehicle was traversing rough terrain, he was thrown against the inside of the vehicle and suffered a cracked vertebra (Log Number: S4002).
3.6 c.
Environmental Conditions (18%)
Example: The driver of an M113A2 was watching a ground guide when he struck a stump hidden by weeds. The final drive housing was damaged. a.
Inadequate Self-Discipline (24%)
Example: Neither the TC nor the driver of an M60A3 tank could see well enough to recognize and avoid hazards in the darkness, Since his tank had fallen behind the rest of the formation and he wanted to catch up, the TC did not stop the tank even when it became apparent that they could no longer distinguish terrain differences and hazards. AS a result, none of the crew members recognized that the tank was proceeding across a rock ledge bordering on a steep dropoff. The TC directed the driver to continue the forward movement at a reduced speed. The tank rolled left about three-quarters of a complete rotation and crushed the TC. The sense of urgency contributed to this hasty decision, which was complicated by darkness (Log Number: 40547).
b. Inadequate Written Procedures, Normal Operations (14%)
Example: A range guard on a night firing exercise was run over by an M48 when he failed to use his flashlight to signal his position. He sustained fatal injuries.
3.9 c.
The Remaining System Inadequacies Spanned Eight Other Categories:
(1) Inadequate Experience (9.5%) (2) Environmental Conditions (9.5%) (3) Fatigue (9.5%) (4) Equipment/Materiel Improperly Designed/Not Provided (9.5%) (5) Inadequate Facilities/Services (9.5%) (6) Inadequate Supervision by a Direct Supervisor (4.9%) (7) Inadequate Unit Training (4.8%) (8) Inadequate Coordination by a Staff Office (4.8).
IMPROPER GROUND GUIDING
Description: Tank/Track Commanders sometimes fail to use ground guides at all or to use them properly. Ground guide problems include the mispositioning of guides, misunderstanding of their procedural responsibilities and misinterpretation of signals from and to the ground guides. These errors are compounded by adverse environmental conditions. This major problem area accounted for 10.8 percent of the accidents, and tied for the highest number of fatalities. Inadequately trained ground guides are a hazard to themselves, CV crews, and other personnel in the immediate area. Their incomplete knowledge of procedures increases the possibility of an accident because TC assume that a ground guide has the skill, training, and experience to do his job. Stumps, ditches, and personnel sleeping alongside, behind, or in front of parked CV constitute real hazards to be identified before moving a tracked vehicle. This finding is consistent with other results investigating system inadequacies. For example, Franklin, Lavender, Seaver, and Still well (1989) found these same six system inadequacies accounted for 78.4 percent of the accidents involving new tracked vehicles, with inadequate self-discipline the most frequent (38.2 percent). The six predominant system inadequacies are discussed in detail below.
SYSTEM INADEQUACY: INADEQUATE SELF-DISCIPLINE
Inadequate self-discipline consists of several related system problems: i.e., individual inadequate composure, inadequate attention, overconfidence in self/others or equipment, lack of confidence, inadequate motivation, haste, pressure, attitude, and effects of alcohol/drugs/illness. Inadequate selfdiscipline occurred in all of the major problems areas and had the highest frequency of occurrence in each. Some possible underlying reasons for these behavioral lapses area: a.
The pressure experienced by individuals during FTXs tends to create blanks in rapid recall of procedural sequences, or a "jump before thinking" reaction to the exercise situation.
b. Supervisory personnel appear not to be involved in guiding, directing, and correcting their juniors whenever they observe an unsafe behavior or events.
SYSTEM INADEQUACY: INADEQUATE SUPERVISION BY DIRECT SUPERVISOR
Inadequate supervision by a direct supervisor appears in seven of the major problem areas. 
SYSTEM INADEQUACY: INADEQUATE EXPERIENCE
The inadequate experience of individuals is related to the system problem of inadequate unit training. It contributed to the accidents in all major problem areas. Possible underlying causes are: a.
CV crews may not be receiving enough practice in procedures as a crew; crews are not being held together as units, and crew turnover can be disruptive because the addition of a new member can mean that the crew must re-learn how each member reacts to varying situations.
b.
The study suggested that the feeling of crew responsibility may not be at a high level. The feeling of crew responsibility ensures that CVs are secure, inspected properly, and operated safely.
SYSTEM INADEQUACY: INADEQUATE WRITTEN PROCEDURES. NORMAL CONDITIONS
Inadequate written procedures contributed to accidents in five of the major problem areas. This system inadequacy is also related to inadequate unit training. Some possible causes are: 
